01957    a2200229   4500003000800000005001700008007000300025008004100028020001800069040001700087041000800104050002500112082001200137100002100149245012600170260005100296300002100347520124100368650006301609700003101672700002401703BJBSDDR20230411090104.0ta190313b1999    enk||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  a9780520219472  bspacBJBSDDR  aspa00aHG 2151 bC143b 199900a364.1681 aCalavita ,Kitty 10aBig money crime :bfraud and politics in the savings and loan crisis /cKitty Calavita; Henry N Pontell; Robert H Tillman  aBerkeley :bUniversity of California P, c1999  a263 p. ;c21 cm   a	
How did a handful of savings and loan executives bring about one of the worst financial disasters of the twentieth century? Examining the S & L crisis as a series of white-collar crimes unparalleled in the history of the United States, Kitty Calavita, Henry Pontell, and Robert Tillman debunk a number of the myths that permeate popular understanding of this multi-billion-dollar disaster. Tempted by the insurance net and federal deregulation aimed at encouraging growth in the banking industry, S & L leaders deliberately defrauded their depositors, stole from their own corporations, and speculated on high-risk ventures with government-insured capital. What the government ultimately chalked up to failed business investments and a sluggish economy, Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman identify as a new type of white-collar crime, committed deliberately against S & L customers and the government. Using material gathered in over one hundred interviews with government officials and recently declassified documents, Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman draw disturbing conclusions about the deliberate nature of the crimes, the political collusion they involved, and the leniency of the justice system in dealing with "big money" criminals. 4aAsociaciones de ahorro y créditoxPrácticas corruptas.1 aPontell, Henry N., d1950-1 aTillman, Robert H.