03818cam a2200469 a 4500003000800000005001700008007000300025008004100028020004000069020001500109020001800124035001300142040001800155041000800173042000800181043001200189050002300201082001400224100003100238245010800269260005900377300003500436504005100471505045900522520159300981586026702574650001902841650001502860650002202875650001602897650003102913650001202944650002802956650002002984650001503004650001803019650001203037651005803049856007703107856007503184856008903259BJBSDDR20230410120954.0ta020906s2003 njua b 001 0 eng  a0691089701 (pbk. : acid-free paper) a0691089698 a9780691089706 a12919070 aDLCcDLCbspa aeng apcc as------14aJC 337bB516o 200300a306.22211 aBermeo, Nancy Gina,d1951-10aOrdinary people in extraordinary times :bthe citizenry and the breakdown of democracy /cNancy Bermeo. aPrinceton, N.J. :bPrinceton University Press,cc2003. axiii, 265 p. :bill. ;c24 cm. aIncludes bibliographical references and index. aPart I: Our literature and interwar Europe -- Heroes or villains? images of citizens and civil society in the literature on democracy -- Ordinary people and the breakdown of democracy in interwar Europe -- -- Part II: South America and our literature revised -- The reluctant coup in Brazil -- The slow-motion coup in Uruguay -- The tragedy of democracy in Chile -- The violent death of democracy in Argentina -- Polarization and the ignorance of elites. aFor generations, influential thinkers--often citing the tragic polarization that took place during Germany's Great Depression--have suspected that people's loyalty to democratic institutions erodes under pressure and that citizens gravitate toward antidemocratic extremes in times of political and economic crisis. But do people really defect from democracy when times get tough? Do ordinary people play a leading role in the collapse of popular government? Based on extensive research, this book overturns the common wisdom. It shows that the German experience was exceptional, that people's affinity for particular political positions are surprisingly stable, and that what is often labeled polarization is the result not of vote switching but of such factors as expansion of the franchise, elite defections, and the mobilization of new voters. Democratic collapses are caused less by changes in popular preferences than by the actions of political elites who polarize themselves and mistake the actions of a few for the preferences of the many. These conclusions are drawn from the study of twenty cases, including every democracy that collapsed in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution in interwar Europe, every South American democracy that fell to the Right after the Cuban Revolution, and three democracies that avoided breakdown despite serious economic and political challenges. Unique in its historical and regional scope, this book offers unsettling but important lessons about civil society and regime change--and about the paths to democratic consolidation today. aWinner of American Political Science Association Comparative Democratization Section Best Book Award 2004 Short-listed for Choice Magazine Outstanding Reference/Academic Book Award 2005 Runner-up for Choice Magazine Outstanding Reference/Academic Book Award 2005 0aCivil society. 0aDemocracy. 0aAuthoritarianism. 0aAllegiance. 0aGovernment, Resistance to. 0aCrises. 0aElite (Social sciences) 4aSociedad civil  4aDemocracia 0aAutoritarismo 4aLealtad 0aSouth AmericaxPolitics and governmentvCase studies.413Table of contentsuhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin051/2002035472.html413Sample textuhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/prin031/2002035472.html423Publisher descriptionuhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin031/2002035472.html