03790cam a2200421 i 4500 128483 20230410121030.0 150417s2015 enkab b 001 0 eng 18579201 2015004118 9781107038714 (hardback) 9781107616813 (paperback) DLC eng DLC rda DLC Eng pcc n-us--- JK 516 K92p 2015 320.973 Kriner, Douglas L. The particularistic president : executive branch politics and political inequality / Douglas L. Kriner, Boston University, Andrew Reeves, Washington University in St. Louis. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2015. xii, 237 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm "As the holders of the only office elected by the entire nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others"-- Provided by publisher. "As holders of the only office elected by the whole nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Kriner and Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others"-- Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. The origins of presidential particularism; 3. Base closings and trade; 4. Disaster declarations and transportation grants; 5. Federal grants and presidential particularism; 6. The electoral rewards of presidential particularism; 7. Conclusion. Executive power United States. Presidents United States. Grants-in-aid United States. Government spending policy United States. Poder ejecutivo Estados Unidos. Presidentes Estados Unidos. Política de gastos públicos Estados Unidos. Reeves, Andrew, 1979- Cover image http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/38714/cover/9781107038714.jpg lcc bk dvf 56580 56580 0 0 lcc 0 0 CS BJB BJB CS 2023-04-10 1 0 JK 516 K92p 2015 00000121916 2018-10-24 00:00:00 1 2018-10-24 bk