The executive branch politics and political inequality Kriner, Douglas L. creator Reeves, Andrew 1979- text bibliography enk Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 2015 monographic eng Eng

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xii, 237 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm "As the holders of the only office elected by the entire nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others"-- "As holders of the only office elected by the whole nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Kriner and Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others"-- Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. The origins of presidential particularism; 3. Base closings and trade; 4. Disaster declarations and transportation grants; 5. Federal grants and presidential particularism; 6. The electoral rewards of presidential particularism; 7. Conclusion. Douglas L. Kriner, Boston University, Andrew Reeves, Washington University in St. Louis. Includes bibliographical references and index. n-us--- Executive power United States Presidents United States Grants-in-aid United States Government spending policy United States Poder ejecutivo Estados Unidos Presidentes Estados Unidos Política de gastos públicos Estados Unidos JK 516 K92p 2015 320.973 9781107038714 (hardback) 9781107616813 (paperback) 2015004118 http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/38714/cover/9781107038714.jpg http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/38714/cover/9781107038714.jpg DLC 150417 20230410121030.0 128483 eng