000			04199cam a2200505 i 4500
003			BJBSDDR
005			20231107154301.0
007			ta
008			180319s2014 nyu b 001 0 eng
020			_a9781451644920 (hardcover)
020			_a1451644922 (hardcover)
020			_a9781451644937 (pbk.)
020			_a1451644930 (pbk.)
040			_aDLC _bspa _cDLC
041			_aeng
042			_apcc
043			_ae------ _an-us---
050	1	4	_aHB 3717 _bG148e 2014
082	0	0	_a330.90511
100	1		_aGalbraith, James K. _q(James Kenneth), _d1952- _92009
245	1	4	_aThe end of normal : _bthe great crisis and the future of growth / _cJames K. Galbraith.
250			_aFirst Simon & Schuster hardcover edition.
264		1	_aNew York : _bSimon & Schuster, _c2014.
300			_ax, 291 pages ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 267-276) and index.
505			_aA contest of one-note narratives -- The optimists' garden. Growth now and forever ; A decade of disruption ; The Great Delusion ; Tweedledum and Tweedledee ; The backwater prophets -- The four Horsemen of the end of growth. The choke-chain effect ; The futility of force ; The digital storm ; The fallout of financial fraud -- No return to normal. Broken baselines and failed forecasts ; The crackpot counterrevolution ; The pivot, the cliff, and the brink of default ; Is there a european crisis? ; Beyond Pangloss and Cassandra -- When Homer returns.
520			_a"The years since the Great Crisis of 2008 have seen slow growth, high unemployment, falling home values, chronic deficits, a deepening disaster in Europe--and a stale argument between two false solutions, "austerity" on one side and "stimulus" on the other. Both sides and practically all analyses of the crisis so far take for granted that the economic growth from the early 1950s until 2000--interrupted only by the troubled 1970s--represented a normal performance. From this perspective the crisis was an interruption, caused by bad policy or bad people, and full recovery is to be expected if the cause is corrected. The End of Normal challenges this view. Placing the crisis in perspective, Galbraith argues that the 1970s already ended the age of easy growth. The 1980s and 1990s saw only uneven growth, with rising inequality within and between countries. And the 2000s saw the end even of that--despite frantic efforts to keep growth going with tax cuts, war spending, and financial deregulation. When the crisis finally came, stimulus and automatic stabilization were able to place a floor under economic collapse. But they are not able to bring about a return to high growth and full employment. Today, four factors impede a return to normal. They are the rising costs of real resources, the now-evident futility of military power, the labor-saving consequences of the digital revolution, and the breakdown of law and ethics in the financial sector. The Great Crisis should be seen as a turning point, a barometer of the rise of unstable economic conditions, which should be regarded as the new normal. Policies and institutions going forward should be designed, above all, modestly, to cope with this fact, maintaining conditions for a good life in difficult times"-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.
650		4	_aCrisis financiera global, 2008-2009 _9406
651		0	_aEurope _xEconomic conditions _y20th century.
651		0	_aEurope _xEconomic policy.
651		0	_aUnited States _xEconomic conditions _y20th century.
651		0	_aUnited States Economic policy _y20th century.
651		4	_aEuropa _xCondiciones económicas _ySiglo XX _94779
651		4	_aEuropa _xPolítica económica _94234
651		4	_aEstados Unidos _xPolítica económica _9840
651		4	_aEstados Unidos _xCondiciones económicas _ySiglo XX _91543
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2lcc _cBK
946			_idpf
999			_c112280 _d112280