000			03758cam a22005654a 4500
001			110587
005			20230410103931.0
008			100405s2010 enkb b 001 0 eng
035			_a16171583
010			_a 2010014627
015			_aGBB042385 _2bnb
016	7		_a015515577 _2Uk
020			_a9780521191005 (hbk.)
020			_a0521191009 (hbk.)
020			_a9780521156011 (pbk.)
020			_a0521156017 (pbk.)
035			_a(OCoLC)ocn503072889
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dUKM _dBTCTA _dYDXCP _dC#P _dCDX _dCOO _dDLC
042			_apcc
043			_af-cg---
050	1	4	_a500 DT 658.26 _bA939t 2010
082	0	0	_a967.5103
100	1		_aAutesserre, Séverine, _d1976-
245	1	4	_aThe trouble with the Congo : _blocal violence and the failure of international peacebuilding / _cSéverine Autesserre.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2010.
300			_axxi, 311 p. : _bmaps ; _c23 cm.
490	1		_aCambridge studies in international relations ; _v115
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aThe peacebuilding world -- A top-down problem -- A top-down solution -- A bottom-up story -- The defeat of bottom-up solutions -- Beyond the Congo.
520			_a"The Trouble with the Congo suggests a new explanation for international peacebuilding failures in civil wars. Drawing from more than 330 interviews and a year and a half of field research, it develops a case study of the international intervention during the Democratic Republic of the Congo's unsuccessful transition from war to peace and democracy (2003-2006). Grassroots rivalries over land, resources, and political power motivated widespread violence. However, a dominant peacebuilding culture shaped the intervention strategy in a way that precluded action on local conflicts, ultimately dooming the international efforts to end the deadliest conflict since World War II. Most international actors interpreted continued fighting as the consequence of national and regional tensions alone. UN staff and diplomats viewed intervention at the macro levels as their only legitimate responsibility. The dominant culture constructed local peacebuilding as such an unimportant, unfamiliar, and unmanageable task that neither shocking events nor resistance from select individuals could convince international actors to reevaluate their understanding of violence and intervention"-- _cProvided by publisher.
651		0	_aCongo (Democratic Republic) _xHistory _y1997-
650		0	_aPeace-building _zCongo (Democratic Republic)
650		0	_aCommunity development _zCongo (Democratic Republic)
650		0	_aConflict management _zCongo (Democratic Republic)
650		0	_aInternal security _zCongo (Democratic Republic)
650		0	_aViolence _zCongo (Democratic Republic)
650		0	_aEthnic conflict _zCongo (Democratic Republic)
650		4	_aConstrucción de la Paz _zCongo (República Democrática).
650		4	_aDesarrollo comunitario _zCongo (República Democrática).
650		4	_aLa gestión de conflicto _zCongo (República Democrática).
650		4	_aLa seguridad interna _zCongo (República Democrática).
650		4	_aViolencia _zCongo (República Democrática).
830		0	_aCambridge studies in international relations ; _v115.
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97805211/56011/cover/9780521156011.jpg
856	4	2	_3Contributor biographical information _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1008/2010014627-b.html
856	4	2	_3Publisher description _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1008/2010014627-d.html
856	4	1	_3Table of contents only _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1008/2010014627-t.html
942			_2lcc _cbk
946			_aYSL
999			_c28733 _d28733