000			03790cam a2200421 i 4500
001			128483
005			20230410121030.0
008			150417s2015 enkab b 001 0 eng
035			_a18579201
010			_a 2015004118
020			_a9781107038714 (hardback)
020			_a9781107616813 (paperback)
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda _dDLC
041			_aEng
042			_apcc
043			_an-us---
050	1	4	_aJK 516 _bK92p 2015
082	0	0	_a320.973
100	1		_aKriner, Douglas L.
245	1	4	_aThe particularistic president : _bexecutive branch politics and political inequality / _cDouglas L. Kriner, Boston University, Andrew Reeves, Washington University in St. Louis.
260			_aCambridge, UK : _bCambridge University Press, _c2015.
300			_axii, 237 p. : _bill., maps ; _c24 cm
520			_a"As the holders of the only office elected by the entire nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others"-- _cProvided by publisher.
520			_a"As holders of the only office elected by the whole nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Kriner and Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others"-- _cProvided by publisher.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. The origins of presidential particularism; 3. Base closings and trade; 4. Disaster declarations and transportation grants; 5. Federal grants and presidential particularism; 6. The electoral rewards of presidential particularism; 7. Conclusion.
650		0	_aExecutive power _zUnited States.
650		0	_aPresidents _zUnited States.
650		0	_aGrants-in-aid _zUnited States.
650		0	_aGovernment spending policy _zUnited States.
650		4	_aPoder ejecutivo _zEstados Unidos.
650		4	_aPresidentes _zEstados Unidos.
650		4	_aPolítica de gastos públicos _zEstados Unidos.
700	1		_aReeves, Andrew, _d1979-
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/38714/cover/9781107038714.jpg
942			_2lcc _cbk
946			_advf
999			_c56580 _d56580