000			02942cam a2200409 a 4500
001			125108
005			20230410123409.0
008			110120s2011 enk b 001 0 eng
035			_a16616623
925	0		_aacquire _b2 shelf copies _xpolicy default
942			_2lcc _cbk
010			_a 2011002457
020			_a9781107005150 (hardback)
020			_a1107005159 (hardback)
035			_a(OCoLC)ocn694393898
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dYDX _dBTCTA _dYDXCP _dBWK _dCDX _dBWX _dRCJ _dDLC
041			_aeng
042			_apcc
043			_aa-is--- _aa-ii--- _ae-ie---
050	1	4	_aK 3165 _bL616m 2011
082	0	0	_a342.02
100	1		_aLerner, Hanna.
245	1	0	_aMaking constitutions in deeply divided societies / _cHanna Lerner.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2011.
300			_aix, 262 p. ; _c24 cm.
520			_a"How can societies still grappling over the common values and shared vision of their state draft a democratic constitution? This is the central puzzle of Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies. While most theories discuss constitution-making in the context of a moment of revolutionary change, Hanna Lerner argues that an incrementalist approach to constitution-making can enable societies riven by deep internal disagreements to either enact a written constitution or function with an unwritten one. She illustrates the process of constitution-writing in three deeply divided societies - Israel, India and Ireland - and explores the various incrementalist strategies deployed by their drafters. These include the avoidance of clear decisions, the use of ambivalent legal language and the inclusion of contrasting provisions in the constitution. Such techniques allow the deferral of controversial choices regarding the foundational aspects of the polity to future political institutions, thus enabling the constitution to reflect a divided identity"-- _cProvided by publisher.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 235-257) and index.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: Part I. Constitutions, Democracy, Identity: 1. Introduction; 2. Three paradigms of democratic constitutions; 3. The incrementalist approach to constitution-making; Part II. Varieties of Constitutional Incrementalism: 4. Informal consociationalism in Israel; 5. Constructive ambiguity in India; 6. Symbolic ambivalence in Ireland; Part III. For and Against Constitutional Incrementalism: 7. Normative arguments for constitutional incrementalism; 8. Potential dangers; 9. Conclusion.
650		0	_aConstitutional law _zIsrael.
650		0	_aConstitutional law _zIndia.
650		0	_aConstitutional law _zIreland.
650		4	_aDerecho constitucional _zIsrael.
650		4	_aDerecho constitucional _zIndia.
650		4	_aDerecho constitucional _zIrlanda.
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/05150/cover/9781107005150.jpg
946			_adpf
999			_c60596 _d60596